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ABSTRACT
We present ARTist, a compiler-based application instru-
mentation solution for Android. ARTist is based on the
new ART runtime and the on-device dex2oat compiler of
Android, which replaced the interpreter-based managed run-
time (DVM) from Android version 5 onwards. Since dex2oat
is yet uncharted, our approach required first and foremost
a thorough study of the compiler suite’s internals and in
particular of the new default compiler backend Optimizing.
We document the results of this study in this paper to fa-
cilitate independent research on this topic and exemplify
the viability of ARTist by realizing two use cases. More-
over, given that seminal works like TaintDroid hitherto de-
pend on the now abandoned DVM, we conduct a case study
on whether taint tracking can be re-instantiated using a
compiler-based instrumentation framework. Overall, our
results provide compelling arguments for preferring compiler-
based instrumentation over alternative bytecode or binary
rewriting approaches.
1. INTRODUCTION
Google’s Android OS has become a popular subject of the
security research community over the last few years. Among
the different directions of research on improving Android’s
security, a dedicated line of work has successfully investigated
how instrumentation of the interpreter (i.e., Dalvik virtual
machine) can be leveraged for security purposes. This line
of work comprises influencing works such as TaintDroid [17]
for analyzing privacy relevant data flows within applica-
tions, AppFence [22] for protecting the end-users’ privacy,
Moses [28] for domain isolation, or Spandex [13] for password
tracking, just to name a few.
However, with the release of Android 5 Lollipop, Google
made a large technological leap by replacing the interpreter-
based runtime with an on-device, ahead-of-time compilation
of apps to platform specific bytecode that is executed in the
new Android runtime (short ART). While this leap did not
affect the app developers, it broke legacy compliance of all
of the previously mentioned security solutions that rely on
instrumentation of the DVM and it restricts them to Android
versions prior to Lollipop. In fact, it has left the security
research community with two choices for carrying on work
that relies on instrumented runtimes: resorting to binary
or bytecode rewriting techniques [16, 21] or adapting to the
novel but uncharted on-device compiler infrastructure.
Our contributions. In this paper, we present a compiler-
based solution that can not only be used to study the feasi-
bility of re-instantiating previous solutions such as dynamic,
intra-application taint tracking and dynamic permission en-
forcement, but, moreover, provides a more robust, reliable,
and integrated application-layer instrumentation approach
than previously possible. Concretely, we make the following
contributions in this paper.
Study of the ART compiler suite. Since the novel ART com-
piler suite, dex2oat, is still uncharted, our solution required
first and foremost a thorough study of the newly introduced
dex2oat compiler. We provide, to the best of our knowledge,
the first in-depth, comprehensive study of the internals of
ART’s compiler suite. In particular, we deep-dive into its
most recent backend called Optimizing that became the de-
fault with Android 6 Marshmallow. Those new insights not
only allow us to implement compiler-based security solutions,
but also form expert knowledge that facilitates independent
research on the topic.
Compiler-based app instrumentation. We design and imple-
ment a novel approach, called ARTist (ART Instrumentation
and Security Toolkit), for application instrumentation based
on an extended version of ART’s on-device compiler dex2oat.
Our system leverages the compiler’s rich optimization frame-
work to safely optimize the newly instrumented application
code. The instrumentation process is guided by static analy-
sis that utilizes the compiler’s intermediate representation
of the app’s code as well as its static program information
in order to efficiently determine instrumentation targets. A
particular benefit of our solution, in contrast to alternative
application layer solutions (i.e., bytecode or binary rewriting),
is that the application signature is unchanged and therefore
Android’s signature-based same origin model and its central
update utility remain intact. We thoroughly discuss further
benefits and drawbacks of security-extended compilers on An-
droid in comparison to bytecode and binary rewriting. Our
results provide compelling arguments for preferring compiler-
based instrumentation over alternative bytecode or binary
rewriting approaches.
Feasibility study for compiler-based taint tracking. To
demonstrate the benefits of a solution such as our ARTist,
we conduct a case study on whether compiler-assisted in-
strumentation can be utilized to realize a dynamic intra-
application taint tracking solution. Our resulting prototype
is evaluated using microbenchmarks and its operational ca-
pability is shown using an open source test suite with known
ground truth.
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Outline. The remainder of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. In Section 2, we present the results of our study of the
dex2oat compiler and its Optimizing backend. We analyze
the requirements for an application-layer instrumentation
solution in Section 3 and compare bytecode and binary rewrit-
ing with compiler-based approaches. We present our ARTist
design in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates use cases for ARTist,
followed by a more detailed case study on compiler-assisted
taint tracking. We discuss limitations and future work of our
solution in Section 6 and conclude this paper in Section 7.
2. BACKGROUNDONARTANDDEX2OAT
We provide general background information on Android’s
managed runtime to set the context of our compiler ex-
tensions (Section 2.1), and afterwards present technical
background information on the compiler suite dex2oat (Sec-
tion 2.2) and in particular on its Optimizing backend (Sec-
tion 2.3).
2.1 Android Runtime
Android is essentially a Linux-based operating system with
an extensive middleware software-stack on top of the ker-
nel. The middleware provides native libraries, a feature-rich
application framework that implements the Android SDK,
and a managed runtime on top of which system as well as
third-party applications and a small number of framework
services are executed. The runtime executes bytecode gen-
erated from Java-based applications and Android’s SDK
components. The runtime provides the code executed within
its environment the necessary hooks to interact with the rest
of the system, such as the operating system, the application
framework services, or the native Android user space (i.e.,
components running outside the managed runtime). Every
process executing an application runtime environment is usu-
ally forked from a warmed-up process, called Zygote, which
has all necessary libraries and a skeleton runtime for the app
code preloaded.
Runtime prior to Android 5. On Android devices prior
to version 5, the runtime consisted of the DEX bytecode
interpreter (or Dalvik virtual machine), which was specifi-
cally designed for devices with constrained resources (e.g.,
register-based execution model instead of stack-based). It
executes Dalvik executable bytecode (short dex), which is
created from the Java bytecode of applications at application
build time. Thus, every application package ships the dex
bytecode compiled from the application Java sources. Addi-
tionally, since Android version 2.2, Dalvik uses just-in-time
compilation of hotspot code segments in order to improve
the runtime performance of applications.
Runtime since Android 5. With Android 5, Google
moved over from an interpreter-based app execution to an
on-device, ahead-of-time compilation of apps’ dex bytecode
to native code that is executed in a newly introduced man-
aged runtime called ART. This shift in the runtime model
was intended to address the app performance needs of An-
droid’s user and developer base. The new compiler suite
was designed from scratch to allow for compile time opti-
mizations that improve application performance, start up
time, battery lifespan, and also to solve some well-known
limitations of the previous interpreter-based runtime, such
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Figure 1: A high-level overview of the dex2oat compiler us-
ing Optimizing backend including the transformation to the IR,
optimizations, and native code generation.
as the 65k method limit1. In particular, Google made the
Optimizing compiler backend, which was introduced as opt-in
feature in Android 5, the default backend in Android 6. In
the following Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we will elaborate in more
technical details on this new compiler suite and in particular
on the Optimizing backend.
Prior documentation of ART. Even though the Android
source code is publicly available as a part of the Android
Open Source Project (AOSP), little attention has yet been
given to ART from a security researcher’s perspective. Paul
Sabanal had an early look [29] at the Android Runtime right
after its silent introduction as a developer option on Android
4.4 KitKat. Beside providing information on the ART exe-
cutable file formats, the paper discusses the idea of hiding
rootkits in framework or app code, assuming root access has
already been granted. However, especially in its early phase,
the Android Runtime has undergone frequent changes, which
by now make this documentation unfortunately outdated.2
Another work [8] focuses on fuzzing the new runtime
with automatically generated input files in order to detect
bugs and vulnerabilities. While it provides some high-level
overview on the compiler structure and its backends, it un-
fortunately omits any deeper information on the Optimizing
backend.
Thus, this background section servers also the purpose of
filling a gap in the technical documentation of those new
Android features.
2.2 DEX2OAT Compiler Suite
Android’s on-device compiler dex2oat is responsible for
the validation of applications and their compilation to native
code. It was designed from scratch to be highly flexible
and of modular structure, providing numerous configuration
possibilities, compiler backends, and native code generators
for supported Android platforms. The general workflow of
the compiler suite is depicted in Figure 1 and its steps will
be explained in the remainder of this section. Providing a
full technically documentation of the entire compiler suite
and all its intricacies would unfortunately exceed the space
limitations of this paper. Therefore, in this section we only
focus on the parts relevant to this paper.
2.2.1 Input File Format
As an input format, dex2oat expects the very same dex files
that DVM used to interpret. This strategical decision ensured
that neither developers nor app store operators needed to
1http://developer.android.com/tools/building/multidex.
html
2E.g., compare the documented oat version 45 and the current
version 63 at the time of this writing.
adapt their code to ART. Developers still upload their apps
as Android Application Package (APK) files that bundle the
app’s code with its resources. When a new app is installed on
the device, dex2oat compiles the app dex bytecode and the
ART runtime executes it, which is completely transparent
for the end user. Using this strategy, ART is still compatible
with the old Android app base without enforcing a fallback
to interpretation, which would loose all benefits that the new
compiler provides.
2.2.2 Compilation
Before the actual compilation is performed, each input
dex file is checked for validity. Those checks are more ex-
tensive and stricter than those implemented in the DVM in
order to allow for state-of-the-art code optimizations. The
compilation itself is done on a per-method base and can
be parallelized. dex2oat delegates the actual compilation
completely to the backend and only writes the results of
the compilation to an oat file along with the original dex
code. There are three compilation phases shared between all
backends:
Transformation: A graph-based intermediate representation
(IR) is created from the dex code. Depending on the actual
backend, multiple IRs are possible.
Optimization: Given a populated IR graph, the code is opti-
mized. Each backend provides its own set of optimization
measures, ranging from very basic techniques to state-of-the-
art algorithms.
Native code generation: The IR nodes are transformed to
native code using a code generator for the specific CPU ar-
chitecture of the current platform. The level of sophistication
of the register allocation algorithm and implementation of
the code generator depend on the backend.
Backends. On an Android stock device running version 5
(Lollipop) or higher, dex2oat can choose between two dif-
ferent backends, Quick and Optimizing. Although Quick
was dex2oat’s default backend until Android 6, we focus
in the remainder of this section and paper on the newer
Optimizing backend. This choice is not only motivated by
the fact that Optimizing is the default backend since An-
droid 6 but also by the fact that Quick is essentially derived
from Dalvik and lacks a sophisticated IR that can support
state-of-the-art compiler optimizations—including sophisti-
cated security-oriented algorithms. However, Optimizing is
designed completely from scratch and little is yet known
about its internal structure and design. In Figure 1 the
compilation steps of Optimizing are depicted. More insights
on the inner workings of the new default compiler backend
will be provided in Section 2.3.
2.2.3 Oat File Format
Oat files are Android’s new file format for apps that are
ready to be loaded and executed by the ART runtime. Even
though the format was newly created for the Android plat-
form, technically speaking oat files are specialized ELF shared
objects that are loaded into processes, i.e., loading a compiled
app into an application process is comparable to loading an
(ELF) shared library into the process space of a dynamically
linked executable. Besides the native code generated with
dex2oat, oat files contain the complete original dex code,
public String getID() {
  TelephonyManager tm =
    getSystemService(TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
  String id = tm.getDeviceId();
  if(id != null) {
     id = prefixID(id);
  } else {
     id = "N/A";
  }
  return id;
}
public String prefixID(String id) {
  String prefix = "ID: ";
  String result = prefix + id;
  Log.d(TAG, prefix + id); // leak id!
  return result;
}
01:
02:
03:
04:
05:
06:
07:
08:
09:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
Figure 2: An example code snippet containing a leak of the
device’s phone number to the logging facility.
which is required to hold up consistency between the code
that the developer wrote in Java, the dex code that used to
be interpreted, and the compiled code, or to allow fall back
to interpretation mode when debugging apps.
2.3 Optimizing Intermediate Representation
We introduce insights into dex2oat’s Optimizing backend,
which we derived mainly from the AOSP source code of
the ART project’s master branch between June 2015 and
February 2016. Optimizing’s intermediate representation is
essentially a control flow graph on the method level, which the
Android developers denote as HGraph. It is further enriched
with structural data about the program and populated with
instruction nodes, denoted as HInstructions. Figure 2 presents
an example Java code and Figure 3 presents the resulting3
HGraph of the getID function in the Optimizing IR. We will
come back to this example in our case study in Section 5.2.
2.3.1 HGraph
The HGraph serves as the single intermediate represen-
tation of the app code. When the graph is created, dex
instructions of the app’s bytecode are scanned one by one
and the corresponding HInstructions are created and inter-
linked with the current basic block and the graph. In order
to allow for complex optimizations, the graph is transformed
into a single static assignment form (SSA). Pairs of value
definitions and usage, so-called def-use-pairs, are created dur-
ing a liveness analysis and explicitly interlinked afterwards.
At this point, phi nodes are introduced where static analysis
cannot reliably decide which value will be assigned at a given
position.
In this form, the graph is amenable to a multitude of
possible optimizations. The available optimizations includes
algorithms such as BoundsCheckElimination to remove redun-
dant bounds checks, GVNOptimization to remove duplicate
code, dead code elimination, or loop invariant code motion to
3Presented code is simplified and limited to relevant instruc-
tions for the sake of readability.
4:   ParameterValue: this
44: NullConstant  
getID: Basic Block 0
6:   LoadString: 'phone'
12: InvokeVirtual: Activity.getSystemService, args:(4, 6)
15: LoadClass: Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager
17: CheckCast args:(12, 15)
21: InvokeVirtual: TelephonyManager.getDeviceId, args:(12)
25: Equal, args:(21, 44)
26: If, args:(25)
getID: Basic Block 1
31: InvokeVirtual: prefixID, args:(4, 21)
getID: Basic Block 2
36: LoadString: 'N/A'
getID: Basic Block 4
43: Phi, args:(31, 36)
35: Return, args:(43)
getID: Basic Block 3
Figure 3: Generated IR in SSA form for the getID() method in
Figure 2.
optimize hotspot code in loops. In the following Section 4, we
will show how this form is also amenable to security-oriented
instrumentation, thus supporting compiler-based security
solutions on Android, such as dynamic taint tracking (see
Section 5.2).
2.3.2 HInstructions
The HGraph nodes roughly correspond to dex instructions.
The supplementary material provides an overview of the dex
instructions and their corresponding HInstructions counter-
parts. Beside this transformation, nodes in the HGraph have
additional attributes that have no equivalent in dex bytecode
(e.g., an SSA index). The HInstructions distinguish between
arguments and inputs. While the former corresponds to the
arguments given to an operator or method, the latter en-
codes additional dependencies that may not be immediately
observable given only the underlying dex code, as in the
case of static method invocations that in addition to their
arguments have an HLoadClass or HClinit as their input. All
HInstructions share a basic set of information: Type, inputs,
uses, id, and further data is attached to each node in or-
der to ease the creation of and working with the HGraph.
Each node is uniquely identified within the graph by its id
that is assigned and incremented continuously during node
creation. The type can be void for methods that have no
return value, not for strings and object types of any kind,
and additionally any of the Java primitive types. In order to
get the actual object type, a fallback to the original dex file
is required. This loose coupling between HInstructions and
dex instructions as well as the presence of a method local
dex program counter in each node show that the IR nodes
are not completely independent of the original dex file.
Semantic consistency. In addition to the instructions that
represent the original application logic, the HGraph also con-
tains meta-instructions to preserve the semantic consistency
between the original Java code of the developer, the dex byte-
code shipped with APKs, and the native bytecode actually
executed in ART. First, additional instructions are inlined
into the graph to support meaningful debugging (e.g., to
map from segmentation faults in ART to actual stack traces)
and to conduct various forms of runtime checks (e.g., check-
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Figure 4: The code instrumentation points before, during, and
after the compilation for different representations of the app code.
Instrumented code is depicted in black boxes.
ing type casting, bounds checking, division-by-zero checks,
or null pointer exceptions). Second, instructions to repre-
sent so-called suspension points are added, which effectively
subdivide the application code into multiple chunks. Each
suspension point between two chunks acts as a synchroniza-
tion point between native code and original dex bytecode in
the program execution and also serves as an entry point for
garbage collectors or debuggers.
3. THE CASE FOR COMPILER-ASSISTED
SECURITY ON ANDROID
A dedicated line of work, including the TaintDroid project
and its derivatives (such as [22, 2]), relied on instrumentation
of the now abandoned Dalvik virtual machine. As a conse-
quence, the research community faces the dilemma on how
to continue this line of work and is left with two choices (see
Figure 4): Either compensating the missing runtime instru-
mentation through app rewriting techniques—dex bytecode
(InstrAPK) or binary (InstrOAT)—or taking advantage of An-
droid’s new compiler suite (InstrDEX, InstrOPT, and InstrBIN).
Although dex bytecode rewriting is well-established in con-
texts such as inline reference monitoring [23, 16, 15, 7] and
taint analysis [31], and ART now supports porting binary
rewriting techniques from commodity systems, we build in
this paper on compiler-based instrumentation to not only
re-instantiate previous approaches that relied on Dalvik VM
instrumentation, but also to explore novel security solutions
that leverage the compiler features.
In the following, we analyze the concrete requirements
that an instrumentation solution should provide and discuss
for each of the above approaches (i.e., bytecode rewriting
InstrAPK, binary rewriting InstrOAT, and compiler-based in-
strumentation) their respective benefits and shortcomings in
fulfilling those requirements. Table 1 provides a summary of
our requirements analysis.
R1. Enforceable security policies. Each of the three
approaches operates on one of the different representations
of the same app code, i.e., bytecode, IR, or binary. Hence,
all three approaches are identical in their capabilities of
instrumenting the code and none of the solutions addresses
any security policy alone.
R2. Strong security boundary. Both rewriting and
the compiler-based approach rely on injecting monitoring
code into the app’s process space and can therefore not
provide a strong security boundary between monitoring and
(potentially) malicious app code (7), e.g., native code. Thus,
all of them can only provide security guarantees for at most
Bytecode
rewriting
Compiler-
based
Binary
rewriting
R1. Enforceable
security policies
identical
R2. Strong secu-
rity boundary
7 7 7
R3. Application
layer only
3 3 3
R4. User privilege
only
3 (7) (7)
R5. Platform in-
dependence
3 3 7
R6. Signature
preservation
7 3 3
R7. Robustness
against optimiza-
tion
7 3 3
R8. Integrated ap-
proach
7 3 7
R9. Supported
versions
all 6+ 5+
3= fulfilled; 7= not fulfilled
Table 1: Comparison of security and deployment features between
bytecode rewriting, compiler-based instrumentation, and binary
rewriting.
honest-but-curious apps.
R3. Application layer only. All approaches can be imple-
mented purely at application layer (3). Deploying bytecode
rewriting techniques InstrAPK in form of separate apps has
been presented in the literature [23, 16, 15, 7]. A compiler-
based solution can be deployed as a separate app that ships
and controls the security-instrumented compiler suite (see
also Section 4.2). For both, the compiler-based approach
and the binary rewriting, the main requirement is access to
the storage location of applications’ oat files, which does not
require system modification.
R4. User privilege only. While dex code is freely available
for non-forward locked apps, accessing applications’ oat files
makes elevated privileges necessary. However, in Section
6.1.3 we discuss an approach that would allow both, binary
and compiler-based rewriting, to circumvent this problem
without requiring elevated privileges.
R5. Platform independence. Bytecode rewriting In-
strAPK (3) and compiler-based instrumentation (3) can be
applied on all platforms supported by Android, since they
modify the code before platform-dependent native code is
generated. Binary rewriting InstrOAT, in contrast, depends
on the actual hardware architecture of the platform (7).
R6. App signature preservation. App signatures are the
foundation of Android’s same origin model that governs the
app update policy or sharing of resources between apps, like
a common process or UID. Consequently, modifying bytecode
InstrAPK and the resulting obligation to resign and repackage
apps breaks this same origin model (7). In contrast, compiler-
based instrumentation (3) and binary rewriting InstrOAT (3)
do not modify the original app package and therefore do not
invalidate the signature.
R7. Robustness against code optimization. The in-
strumentation point determines whether any instrumented
code will be subject to optimization at compile time. Ap-
plying optimization algorithms to instrumented code has
the potential to interfere with the semantics of the mod-
ification through, e.g., instruction reordering, inlining, or
similar techniques of state-of-the-art compilers like Optimiz-
ing. Current bytecode rewriting approaches InstrAPK are
applied before compilation, thus any instrumentation has to
be robust against optimization by Optimizing—an aspect
not yet further investigated by contemporary research (7).
On the other hand, binary rewriting InstrOAT is restricted to
instrumenting optimized code (3), but misses the chance to
reuse the rich Optimizing framework to also optimize added
security code. The sweet spot is compiler-based instrumenta-
tion that provides full control over which optimizations are
applied when and in which ordering (3). Even more, this
enables creating optimizations that are specifically tailored
towards improving the instrumented code by utilizing the
static program information that is present in the compiler.
R8. Integration into toolchain. Integrating an instru-
mentation system into an existing toolchain ensures per-
petual development and fixes by the community as well as
access to established and well-tested tools and frameworks.
In this case, even though the ART project is open source
and therefore open to the community, the compiler is mostly
maintained by Google itself. Consequently, compiler-driven
solutions that do not break with the toolchain’s regular func-
tionality, benefit from the continuing improvements (3). In
the case of ARTist, the amount of code that needed to be
changed is minimal and therefore easy to adapt for newer
versions of the toolchain. Bytecode rewriting InstrAPK and
binary rewriting InstrOAT are developed separately from the
toolchain and do not reap those benefits (7).
R9. Version support. While bytecode instrumentation
InstrAPK can be applied to all Android versions, compiler-
based approaches and binary rewriting InstrOAT depend on
ART and therefore can only be applied since Lollipop (5+),
where a compiler-based solution (as presented here) should
utilize the Optimizing backend on Android 6+ in preference
to Quick.
Sweet spot. In conclusion, comparing the security and
deployment features that the three available instrumentation
approaches provide, a compiler-based approach has very
appealing properties and occupies a sweet spot among all
approaches.
4. ARTist DESIGN
In this section, we present the architecture of the ART
Instrumentation and Security Toolkit. ARTist consists of two
separate components: a security-instrumented compiler (sec-
compiler) and an app to deploy the compiler (deployment
app). The sec-compiler is our implementation of a compile-
time instrumentation tool that is based on the dex2oat com-
piler. The latter is a regular Android application that ships,
deploys, and manages the sec-compiler .
4.1 Security-Instrumented Compiler
Choice of instrumentation point. The general concept
of security-instrumented compilers is not restricted in its mod-
ifications of the compilation code. Given dex2oat’s modular
design, there are immediately multiple possibilities apparent
where app modifying code could be placed. For instance,
dex2oat’s design would easily allow porting bytecode and
binary rewriting approaches (InstrDEX & InstrBIN) into the
compiler infrastructure (cf. Figure 4). Of the different choices,
ARTist’s sec-compiler is concretely designed to operate on the
intermediate representation of dex2oat’s Optimizing backend
(InstrOPT), where the existing optimization infrastructure
and static code information in the Optimizing IR allow for
efficient and precise code modification. More precisely, our
app instrumentation code is realized as an HOptimization,
which, as a result, is no different than other optimizations in
the sense that they are provided with required information,
such as the current method’s HGraph, and are modularly
integrated into the optimization workflow. As HOptimization,
our security instrumentation logic has full control over the
ordering and execution of optimizations, which opens up the
opportunity to optimize the already instrumented code by
creating or applying compatible optimizations that improve
the performance of the security code.
Generally, using the HOptimization interface one can extend
the compiler with custom functionality that is decoupled
from dex2oat’s code base. We will refer to those independent
extensions as Modules for the remainder of this paper.
Spotting instrumentation targets. HGraph supports the
visitor pattern [19] that enables us to iterate over, inspect,
and modify each single HInstruction of the app’s code. In
contrast to method hooking techniques, we can therefore
operate at the instruction level. In ARTist, HGraphVisitors
are primarily used to identify instrumentation targets and
apply the desired modification. However, they can also be
utilized to bootstrap static analysis. We will see concrete
implementations using a visitor to collect instrumentation
sites for our dynamic permission enforcement system in Sec-
tion 5.1 and starting points for backward slicing in our taint
tracking case study in Section 5.2.
Modification capabilities. Given an instrumentation tar-
get in the form of an HInstruction, there are several possi-
bilities for modification like changing types, inputs, or even
removing/replacing the instruction altogether. It is also pos-
sible to instantiate new instructions of any type and inline
them before or after the current target. ARTist provides a
new API dedicated to automate such modifications if pro-
vided with the information which methods, where and what
to instrument. Since we are only generating nodes in the
form of HInstruction objects and insert them into the HGraph,
we do not have to modify the generation of native code from
the IR. This means that the code generator is agnostic to-
wards our changes and receives no unexpected instructions
or structures. The result of this integrated solution is that
we still take advantage of the robustness of Optimizing’s
code generators, which are well-tested, constantly improved,
and in productive use on every stock Android phone running
version 6+.
Configuration. Using Modules, the instrumentation and
modification process is already flexible. To further increase
flexibility, Modules can, in turn, depend on policy configu-
ration files that govern the instrumentation process. While
the design of such policy files highly depends on the con-
crete Module, there are recurring and common patterns, for
instance, the amount and type of instrumentation targets
that should be detected, as demonstrated in Section 5.1. In
general, this allows adaptation of existing instrumentation so-
lutions to new targets or provisioning them with new security
policies.
4.2 Compiler Deployment App
Responsibility of the deployment app is to deploy the
sec-compiler at application layer in addition to the sys-
tem’s dex2oat binary. Using deployment app, one can create
security-instrumented versions of installed applications by
re-compiling the apps’ bytecode with sec-compiler and replac-
ing the oat files stored4 on filesystem. To make the Android
runtime agnostic to this instrumentation, two particular chal-
lenges had to be overcome. First, Android has mechanisms
in place to verify that oat files correspond to their respective
apps and that the paths of the oat files are correct. Our
implementation solves this challenge by rewriting paths and
checksums to match those that the system dex2oat would
have generated. Second, the oat files are by default stored
at and loaded from a protected location to which 3rd party
apps have no access. A naïve solution to this problem would
be to require extended privileges for our deployment app
(e.g., a dedicated SELinux type or root on security-relaxed
after-market ROMs). We discuss alternatives to the naïve
approach in Section 6, which abstain from extended privi-
leges by using app virtualization or reference hijacking. After
solving those challenges, the Android default runtime will
load the instrumented oat file while remaining agnostic to
the fact that we replaced it.
Executing the compiler. Instead of shipping deployment
app with a statically linked dex2oat binary that includes our
ARTist extensions, we opted for utilizing a copy of Android’s
default dex2oat binary and leveraging its modularity to ship
our extensions to the compiler suite as separate libraries. We
use the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable to ensure
that our dex2oat loads and dynamically links our ARTist
libraries, such as libart-compiler.so, from the assets directory
of the deployment app.
Inlining custom code. While the instrumentation with
ARTist already provides powerful tools to modify the appli-
cation, most security solutions require an additional custom
code library within the app (e.g., additional taint tracking
logic in Section 5.2). To facilitate adding custom code to
an instrumented app, deployment app has a preprocessing
step that is executed before the app’s bytecode is compiled.
This step utilizes the DexMerger utility to combine the app’s
original bytecode with the additional code library. During
compilation, connections between original and new code are
built in form of invocations of the added code’s methods.
5. USE CASES
We demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of our sys-
tem by discussing several use cases out of which we exemplar-
ily realized two as ARTist Modules. First, we implemented
an Inline Reference Monitor (IRM) injection Module to allow
for dynamic permission enforcement. Second, we conduct
a case study on realizing intra-app taint tracking through
inlining of taint tracking code. In addition, we discuss further
ideas for ARTist Modules.
4Located at /data/app/<package-name>-1/oat/arm/base.
odex
5.1 IRM for Dynamic Permission Enforcement
In the literature, Inline Reference Monitoring (IRM) is
mostly implemented by modifying the bytecode before the in-
stallation [23, 16] or by hooking into an application’s method
at the caller or callee side at runtime [7]. By utilizing a
security-instrumented compiler, IRM can be implemented
without the need to resign and repackage apps as it is re-
quired by established approaches. Moreover, dex2oat-based
IRM can operate at instruction granularity instead of at
the method level. Those capabilities are showcased by our
IRM injection module that allows for dynamic permission
enforcement, as shown by [7, 23, 33] on Android versions
before Marshmallow.
The module is split into two distinct parts, the code in-
jection routine that will inline permission enforcement code
and the accompanying library that acts as a policy decision
point. While the first directs the instrumentation process
at installation time, the latter enforces the user’s policy at
runtime.
Code injection. We first utilize ARTist to locate the call
sites of permission-protected SDK methods that are defined
in a policy configuration file. Afterwards, ARTist injects
additional calls to our companioning library right before the
call sites to check whether the critical method invocations
should be allowed. This ensures that the control flow is
diverted to our policy decision point before the execution of
permission-protected methods.
The limitations imposed by the choice of this rather basic
strategy are discussed in Section 6.2.2.
Policy decision point. The library that our Module injects
into target apps provides methods to check their current state
of permissions. Based on the given user permission policy, the
library either allows or rejects the execution of a protected
SDK method.
5.2 Case study: Taint Tracking
Established approaches for dynamic taint tracking on An-
droid [17] rely on instrumenting the by now scrapped DVM
for intra-application taint tracking or directly rewrite byte-
code [31]. In this case study, we explore the applicability
of a compiler-based instrumentation framework like ARTist
to re-instantiate intra-app taint tracking for applications
on Android version 6 and higher. That is, through a pro-
totypical implementation, we want to investigate whether
inlining taint tracking logic into the application code base
with ARTist at compilation time can be a surrogate for solu-
tions prior to Android version 5. Please note, that this case
study does not aim at a full replacement of existing solutions
like TaintDroid [17], but at demonstrating a new potential
foundation for future taint-tracking on Android.
5.2.1 Module Design
In general, we want to track information as it flows through
the code using tracking logic inlined by a new HOptimization
in the Optimizing backend. However, simply assigning each
single value that should be tracked a taint tag and updating
the tag for each single instruction operating on it will incur
a major performance penalty. To minimalize the runtime
impact, we split our approach into two phases: analysis and
instrumentation. In the analysis phase, we identify flows of
tainted information between sources and sinks. By restrict-
ing ourselves only to those relevant flows of the values we are
interested in, we avoid generating irrelevant but costly taint
tracking code for parts of the method that never actually
influence the data that is obvserved and gain noticable per-
formance improvements over more naïve taint tracking. In
the instrumentation phase, code will be inlined that creates,
propagates, and checks the taint values along the identi-
fied data flows. Our combined analysis and instrumentation
achieves flow-, path-, object-, and context-sensitive taint
tracking.
While [31] and [25] also utilize static analysis to optimize
and guide the instrumentation process, both assume a holistic
view on the application in form of a control or data flow graph.
In contrast, dex2oat backends operate on a per-method level,
leaving the primary challenge for our taint tracking Module
to achieve similar tracking properties while inspecting one
method at a time. A naïve solution to this problem would
be to retrofit the compiler suite to provide an application-
wide view and instrumentation. However, our prototype
demonstrates how we can still achieve taint tracking for the
whole application while restricting ourselves to a per-method
view and instrumentation. To this end, we introduce in the
following a new design for storing and propagating taint tags,
in particular we have to refine the definitions of sink and
source.
5.2.2 Analysis Phase
In order to optimize the instrumentation with taint track-
ing code, we exploit the processing features (e.g., HGraph’s
Visitor [19] pattern support) of the dex2oat compiler to detect
the data flow sources and sinks and afterwards use its static
analysis features to identify the relevant data flows and the
operations along those flows that have to be instrumented.
Refining source and sink definition. The literature on
taint tracking for Android defines sources and sinks as the
API methods that input privacy-sensitive information into
the application process (e.g., framework functions that re-
turn sensitive data, such as the location or telephony API)
or, respectively, leak privacy-sensitive information from the
application process (e.g., file handles, Internet sockets, or log-
ging facilities). Since dex2oat is operating on a per-method
level, we cannot assume that our analysis is able to always
connect a sink and a source (e.g., when they are located
in different methods). To address this problem, we have to
connect the data flows of tainted variables across the different
methods while maintaining the per-method-based analysis.
To this end, we introduce in addition to the above men-
tioned sinks and sources from the literature—in the following
denoted as global sinks/sources—new method-local sinks/-
sources, more precisely HInstructions, which form the entry
and exit points for inter-procedural data flows. Thus, global
sinks and sources are points of interest for taint tag creation
and check, respectively, while local sinks and sources are for
inter-procedural tag propagation. For local sinks and sources
we differentiate between three categories each: local sources
include arguments provided to the current method (LSO1),
return values from method invocations (LSO2), and values
read from fields (LSO3). Conversely, local sinks are method
invocations that leak values through its parameters from
the current method (LSI1), return statements of the current
method (LSI2), and field setting instructions (LSI3). At the
beginning of the analysis phase we collect all sinks within all
methods and in a subsequent step detect all relevant sources
for those sinks (see next paragraph).
public String getID() {
  TelephonyManager tm =
    getSystemService(TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
  String id = tm.getDeviceId();
  if(id != null) {
     id = prefixID(id);
  } else {
     id = "N/A";
  }
  return id;
}
public String prefixID(String id) {
  String prefix = "ID: ";
  String result = prefix + id;
  Log.d(TAG, prefix + id);
  return result;
}
01:
02:
03:
04:
05:
06:
07:
08:
09:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
LSI2
GSI
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10: LoadString: 'ID: '
35: LoadString: 'TAG’
60: LoadClass: Landroid/util/Log;
61: ClinitCheck, args:(60)  uses:[64]
78: InvokeVirtual: TaintLib.checkLeakage,
      args:(75, 77)
64: InvokeStaticOrDirect: Log.d,
      args:(35, 10, 8, 61)
76: InvokeVirtual: TaintLib.setReturnTaint,
      args:(75, 77)
66: Return args:(8)
prefixID: Basic Block 1
 6: ParameterValue: this
 8: ParameterValue: Ljava/lang/String
77: InvokeVirtual: TaintLib.getArgTaint, args:(75)
prefixID: Basic Block 0
6:   LoadString: 'phone'
12: InvokeVirtual: Activity.getSystemService, args:(4, 6)
15: LoadClass: Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager
17: CheckCast args:(12, 15)
21: InvokeVirtual: TelephonyManager.getDeviceId, args:(12)
25: Equal, args:(21, 44)
26: If, args:(25)
getID: Basic Block 1
52: InvokeVirtual: TaintLib.
      setArgTaint, args:(51, 47)
31: InvokeVirtual: printID,
      args:(4, 21)
54: InvokeVirtual: TaintLib.
      getReturnTaint, args:(51)
getID: Basic Block 2
36: LoadString: 'N/A'
getID: Basic Block 4
43: Phi, args:(31, 36)
53: InvokeVirtual: TaintLib.
      setReturnTaint, args:(51, 54)
35: Return, args:(43)
getID: Basic Block 3
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 5: Tracking tainted variable id from example of Figure 2. All discovered sinks and sources are marked. Solid lines indicate
intra-procedural data flows of tainted variables, dashed lines inter-procedural data flows between local sink-source pairs. Right hand side
depicts the inlined taint tracking code to propagate taint tags.
Creating intra-procedural data flows. After collecting
all local and global sinks, we create for each sink a backward
slice within the currently analyzed method by inspecting
the current instruction and recursively tracing back its input
parameters depending on the concrete instruction type to
discover all sources that influence this sink. For instance,
Figure 5 continues the example code from Figure 2. In the
Java code on the left hand side, all sinks have been identified
(i.e., the parameter id passed to function prefixID in line 9
is a local sink of type LSI1, the return statements in lines 14
and 21 form local sinks of type LSI2, and in line 20 the call
to Log forms a global sink). Using backwards slicing (solid
lines 1 , 3 , and 5 ) the local sources in lines 17 (LSO1) and
9 (LSO2) as well as the global source in line 6 (getDeviceID
call to retrieve device’s phone number) have been identified.
Each resulting backward slice is defined by its starting point
(i.e., the sink) and all found endpoints (i.e., the sources).
Constants cannot be tainted and are therefore explicitly
omitted as sources. Together those backward slices form the
input for the instrumentation phase.
Note that high precision of this analysis is desirable but
not required for secure taint tracking. Higher precision of
this backwards slicing helps in removing irrelevant taint
tracking code for the observed values and hence improves
performance of the instrumented application’s process, but
actual taint propagation occurs at runtime and the set of our
slices contains a superset5 of the relevant flows for complete
tracking of tainted values.
5.2.3 Instrumentation Phase
In the instrumentation phase, we inline code that at run-
time creates taint tags for global sources and that checks
taints at global sinks. Additionally, we inline code that inter-
procedurally propagates taints at runtime from a local sink
to a local source, ensuring the data flow of a tainted value
across multiple methods correctly propagates the taints.
5The use of reflection is an exception to this rule since this
poses serious problems for static analyses.
TaintLib. In order to improve the flexibility of our solution
by not restricting our system to a specific implementation
for storing, updating, and checking taints, we make use of
ARTist’s modular design and deploy the instrumentation
code in form of a new companion library called TaintLib
that is merged by ARTist into the app code at compile time.
TaintLib in turn relies on a policy file that defines the global
and local sources/sinks as well as the sources’ taints tags.
TaintLib provides source-type-specific taint-set methods, calls
to which are inlined at all sources, and sink-type-specific
taint-get methods, calls to which are inlined at all sinks.
By injecting TaintLib method calls instead of concrete taint
tracking logic, we decouple the instrumentation from the taint
management code. For global sources, taint-get retrieves and
sets the taint tag according to the policy and taint-set at
global sinks checks6 the taint tag. In contrast, for local
sinks taint-set propagates the tag together with the tainted
value to the next local source, where it is retrieved with
taint-get. By instrumenting all methods alike, an implicit
contract between all methods is established and fulfilled,
i.e., every time a taint-get tries to obtain the taint value
of a method parameter on the callee side, we assume that
the corresponding taint-set has been executed in the calling
method to provide the taint data. In case the slice contains
multiple sources, the output of their corresponding taint-gets
is combined by injecting a call to a combination method that
will return the merged taint tag.
To continue our running example, the right hand side of
Figure 5 presents the IR of the code snippet with taint-set
and taint-get calls inlined. For instance, the setArgTaint call
for LSI1 in basic block 2 of getID (HInstructions 52) precedes
the local sink in HInstructions 31 that invokes the prefixID
function. The setArgTaint instruction transfers the taint
of id inter-procedurally to the getArgTaint instruction in
HInstruction 77 of basic block 0 of prefixID (dashed line
6While a naïve check halts the program when tainted data is
about to leak, invoking a sanitizer as suggested by [25] can
easily be implemented in ARTist.
2 ), from where it is intra-procedurally propagated using the
backwards slicing information (solid line 3 ). Similarly, the
taint is propagated back from prefixID to getID through
the return statement and variable assignment (dashed line
4 ).
Inter-procedural taint tag propagation channel. In
the case of parameters (LSO1 and LSI1) and method re-
turns (LSO2 and LSI2), there are at runtime always pairs
of taint-sets and taint-gets, given by the fact that for each
callee method, there is a caller method that also has been
instrumented. Combining this with the observation that a
caller-callee method pair is always executed by the same
thread, the taint propagation can be realized using thread
local storage for a taint stack. At the caller side, the taint in-
formation is pushed onto a per-thread stack and at the callee
side it is popped again, vaguely resembling the x86 calling
convention for passing arguments to methods. Keeping in
mind that almost every injected TaintLib method call ac-
cesses the taint information, replacing more straightforward
approaches for taint storage (like a single HashMap) with
cheaper stack operations also benefits the overall performance
of our taint tracking solution.
In the case of field operations (LSO3 and LSI3), we can
neither assume them to appear in pairs nor to be executed on
the same thread and therefore employ a thread-safe mapping
in the form of a ConcurrentHashMap. This, however, raises
the challenge of providing easily computable, stable and
unique keys. If we consider our taint tags not to store the
taint value of a certain value, but of a certain location, we
can compute stable identifiers for fields and use them as
keys. For static class fields, identifying the specific class and
field is sufficient and can be precomputed during compilation.
The current implementation injects the computed key as a
constant into the HGraph and provides it as an argument
to a field taint-set or taint-get. For object fields, we do not
only need to identify classes but concrete objects, which
requires runtime information. In this case, we only inject the
field identifier as a constant and provide it together with the
field’s concrete object to a newly added TaintLib function.
The returned key is robust to object aliasing, so we do not
loose track of objects in e.g. collections. Afterwards, we can
use this key in a taint-set or taint-get for the object field.
It is important to note that our approach to taint tracking
depends not only on the entity for which we store taints
(i.e., variable locations instead of values), but also on the
type of data to which we assign taint values. In our model,
we track taints only for primitive types and the taint tag
of objects is transitively given by their field’s tags. In case
of non-primitive fields, the rule applies recursively because
eventually all objects can be decomposed to primitives. This
design decision is motivated by the fact that tracking all
taint-set and taint-get operations on fields and on all method
invocations is more fine-grained than storing taint informa-
tion at the object level.
5.3 Further Use Cases
Dynamic analysis. Compiler-based solutions are inher-
ently well-suited for white box approaches that require an
understanding of the application’s internals. One example is
the taint trackingModule described above that re-instantiates
TaintDroid-inspired intra-app taint tracking. Other exam-
ples are existing works on commodity systems [12, 3] that
already utilize compilers for information flow control, which
can now be realized on Android as well.
Container solutions. Modifications of the Android run-
time environment have been used in the past (for instance
Divide7, now part of Google Android for Work) to establish
container solutions that, e.g., encrypt file system I/O of
apps or restrict inter-application communication. Using a
compiler-based approach such as ARTist, similar container
solutions can be established by replacing the corresponding
method invocations (e.g., calls to Java’s I/O classes) with
calls to injected security-enhanced versions of the same.
Code replacement and compile-time patching. Google
has recently started separating security-critical libraries, such
as the notorious WebKit, from application packages into
stand-alone apps that are called by apps on-demand. This al-
lows Google to maintain those libraries on an ecosystem-wide
scale and roll out security patches more effectively. Since
ARTist is not only able to inject but also to replace or re-
move code from an app’s code base, ARTist can also be
used to apply compile-time patches by replacing vulnerable
libraries within apps with fixed versions. In an extreme case,
this mechanism could allow for removing entire libraries by
mocking all their method invocations (e.g., removing ads),
or moving code partitions behind a strong security bound-
ary, such as a dedicated process, and reconnect the code
through inter-process communications (e.g., as done in the
AdSplit [32] or AdDroid [26] solutions).
Beyond security: profiling and debugging. Besides its
application in the security domain, using ARTist to inject
tracing, debugging or profiling code allows to gain additional
insights into third party applications. A basic example is the
method call-tracing we employ in our robustness evaluation
in Section 6.1.1.
6. DISCUSSION
This section evaluates ARTist and its modules in terms
of performance, inherent and implementation-specific limita-
tions, and discusses ideas for future work to overcome those
and extend our system.
6.1 ARTist
We first evaluate and discuss general limitations of the
ART Instrumentation and Security Toolkit.
6.1.1 Robustness
We briefly evaluate ARTist in terms of its robustness by
applying an instrumentation routine to a subset of the top
apps from different Google play store categories and observ-
ing their execution. For the experiment, ARTist injects
into each method of a target application calls to a carefully
crafted tracing method that is merged into the app’s code.
The tracing method uses stack inspection to determine its
caller and prints the corresponding method name to the log.
All tests are conducted on a real device (rooted Nexus 5
running Android 6 factory image). Out of 85 non-multidex
apps (see Section 6.1.3), 83 apps were successfully instru-
mented and remained stable when tested (97.64% success
rate), indicating the robustness of ARTist’s instrumentation
capabilities.
7http://www.divide.com
Because runtime overhead for instrumented apps largely
depends on the concrete code that is injected, we refer to the
concrete benchmarks of the Modules in Sections 6.2.1 and
6.3.1 for a performance evaluation.
6.1.2 Conceptual Limitations
Native code support. Optimizing operates by design on
dex input only. Bundled native libraries (i.e., C/C++) that
are connected via JNI are never transformed into Optimiz-
ing’s IR and therefore neither instrumented nor inspected
by our prototype. Native code components are a limitation
of the attacker model of not only our concept but indeed an
open challenge for most of the solutions by Android secu-
rity research, e.g. code analysis as well as IRM solutions in
particular.
Potential fallback to dex. The oat files produced by
dex2oat still contain the original dex byte code of the app
to allow fallback to interpretation mode. Naturally, fallback
to interpretation would render our instrumentation of the
compiled dex byte code futile. This fallback is currently
limited to app debugging, however, no guarantees exist that
such a fallback cannot be triggered maliciously. Similarly,
dynamically loaded dex code [27, 20] (e.g., via the DexClass-
Loader) is by default compiled to native bytecode, but no
guarantee can be given that dynamically loaded code cannot
fall back to interpretation.
6.1.3 Implementation Limitations
Permanence of instrumentation. Instrumentation of an
app’s oat file might be reverted through an application up-
date or a firmware update where apps are re-compiled. Thus,
there exists a window of opportunity for an attacker to start
an uninstrumented app after a system or app update. Apps,
however, cannot be started programmatically after install/up-
date until the user has started the app manually and both
scenarios can be detected by deployment app via system noti-
fications (i.e., broadcasts). Assuming that the system notifies
the deployment app fast enough in order to re-instrument
the updated app before the user manually starts the app,
the window of opportunity in which an uninstrumented app
is started can be closed.
Deployment strategy. In order to create a pure appli-
cation layer solution, our prototype currently relies on the
naïve approach of requesting elevated privileges to replace
the installed app oat file with the instrumented version. We
can eliminate this requirement by integrating ARTist with
an application layer only sandboxing solution that provides
file system virtualization, such as Boxify [6] or NJAS [9], or
by resetting the execution environment and replacing loaded
libraries using reference hijacking [34]. Both approaches en-
able the manipulation of file paths from the original to the
instrumented oat file at application startup time.
Multidex support. Currently our ARTist prototype does
not support multidex8 apps. Enabling support for such
apps would not only improve coverage of our prototype
for more complex apps, but also simplify the merging of
additional code by shifting the merge process from the pre-
processing step in deployment app into the sec-compiler by
8http://developer.android.com/tools/building/multidex.
html
simply providing the additional dex files as input to the
compilation process.
6.2 Dynamic Permission Module
We briefly evaluate the performance impact of our dynamic
permission module and discuss limitations.
6.2.1 Evaluation
The additional security checks inlined by our Module are
only inserted before permission-protected SDK method calls,
so we cannot rely on benchmark apps, because they rarely
trigger the added functionality. Therefore, we evaluate the
performance impact of our permission checking code using
custom microbenchmarks. Table 2 depicts the results of
our measurements for calls that are protected by 3 distinct
permissions. The overhead encountered in the microbange-
marks ranges between 1.18% and 30.65%, thus showing the
feasibility of our prototype.
6.2.2 Limitations
Restriction to synchronous calls. In order to demon-
strate the straightforward implementation of an ARTist Mod-
ule, we opted for a simple instrumentation strategy that only
covers synchronous permission-protected method calls. In
result, the current prototype does not support callbacks or
asynchronicity and its implementation should therefore be
considered a proof-of-concept only.
Best effort permission map. In order to direct ARTist to
the instrumentation targets, i.e., the application’s permission-
protected method calls, we utilize a map of methods calls to
the permissions enforced by those calls. While the PScout
project [5] provides exact API method to permission map-
pings up to Android version 5.1.1, ARTist operates on Marsh-
mallow that requires mappings for Android 6. Consequently,
the permission map utilized by our Module is a hand picked
subset of methods from the v5.1.1 PScout map that did not
change for Marshmallow.
6.3 Taint Tracking Module
We evaluate our taint tracking Module in terms of feasibil-
ity, performance, and the limitations of its current prototyp-
ical implementation.
6.3.1 Evaluation
Runtime overhead. We leverage an Android microbench-
mark application to evaluate the performance of our pro-
totype. Since our taint-instrumentation only affects the
performance of Java code, we specifically chose the Passmark
benchmark, which does not contain native libraries and imple-
ments all benchmarks in Java. Table 3 compares the results of
the baseline benchmark with a non-instrumented Passmark
app to those of an instrumented and taint-aware version.
The results show an overhead ranging between 7.74% and
30.73%, which is within an acceptable range for a taint track-
ing approach that is not fully tuned for performance. This
result is also roughly comparable to microbenchmark results
of TaintDroid’s [17] interpreter-based approach. However, as
stated in [24], microbenchmarks are not very representative
in user-driven scenarios such as Android apps, so we take
this result with a grain of salt.
Overall performance can be enhanced by introducing cus-
tom optimizations specifically tailored towards improving
Microbenchmarks
Tested Method Permission Baseline Instrumented Penalty
WifiManager.getConfiguredNetworks() ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 0.681 ms 0.742 ms 8.89%
WifiManager.isWifiEnabled() ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 0.071 ms 0.072 ms 1.18%
WifiManager.getScanResults() ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 0.452 ms 0.591 ms 30.65%
BluetoothAdapter.startDiscovery() BLUETOOTH_ADMIN 0.910 ms 0.940 ms 3.32%
Table 2: Microbenchmarks averaged over 60.000 runs. The baseline benchmarks measure the pure execution time of the permission-
protected call while the instrumented benchmarks measure the protected call and the additional permission check.
Passmark
Test Baseline Taint-Aware Penalty in %
CPU 32521 22526 30.73%
Disk 24893 20777 16.53%
Memory 3627 3346 7.74%
Table 3: Passmark results averaged over 5 runs.
taint tracking code. One approach would be to eliminate
taint-sets and taint-gets that are based on stack operations
and cancel each other out, e.g., alternating pushs and pops of
the same tag as seen for methods that return the return value
of another method call. Moreover, the analysis phase allows
to abstain from instrumenting apps that do not contain any
global taint sinks in order to not impact performance at all
in this case.
Functional Evaluation. We conducted this case study
to research whether intra-application taint tracking can be
achieved with an compiler-based instrumentation framework
such as ARTist, so our functional evaluation focuses on de-
tecting different kinds of data leaks in apps. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no standardized test suite
specifically tailored towards evaluating dynamic taint track-
ing systems for Android apps, and testing real applications is
not feasible because they lack the required ground truth. In
order to overcome this unsatisfactory situation, we decided to
exploit an open source suite called DroidBench [4, 1] that was
initially created to benchmark static taint tracking systems.
Even though this does not immediately apply to a dynamic
system such as ours, we can still leverage the fact that it
provides us with an assortment of applications with differ-
ent but well-defined leakage behavior. Table 4 summarizes
our Module’s results for those tests and categories within
scope. Tests for implicit flows, inter-component communi-
cation, and reflection are omitted because they currently
exceed the scope of our proof-of-concept taint tracking. As
we are abusing the benchmark suite, we need to be careful
which conclusions we draw from the test results. The first
insight we gain, however, is that our case study succeeded in
showing that intra-app taint tracking can be implemented
as a pure application layer solution using compiler-driven
instrumentation. The second insight we derive is that, as
indicated by lower results such as those for the Android
Specifics category, our proof-of-concept does not yet catch
up with previous works such as TaintDroid. Nonetheless, our
work not only shows the feasibility of the approach but also
lays the foundation for creating a full-fledged taint tracking
system for Android versions above Marshmallow that uti-
lizes compiler-based instrumentation and does not require
modification of the operating system.
DroidBench
Category Successful Tests Ratio
Callbacks 14/15 93%
Lifecycle 13/14 92.9%
General Java 14/20 70%
Aliasing 1/1 100%
Android Specifics 5/9 55.6%
Field & Object Sensitivity 7/7 100%
Overall 54/66 81.8%
Table 4: Results for the DroidBench taint tracking evaluation.
Broken tests and categories not applicable to our system are
omitted.
6.3.2 Limitations
No tracking of implicit flows. Like TaintDroid [17], our
system currently does not track implicit flows (i.e., data leak-
age using control flow dependencies) and malevolent apps
could exfiltrate data in a way that is unnoticeable by our
prototype. As the TaintDroid authors discuss, mitigating
leakage through control flows would require static analysis
and access to the app’s source code—both of which Taint-
Droid could not provide. ARTist however is already provided
with the full app code and it would be highly interesting
future work to investigate to which extent the structural
program information of the IR and analytical features of the
compiler backend (e.g., Optimizing) can help to remedy the
limitations of customary taint tracking solutions on Android.
Taint tracking boundaries. The compiler is restricted
to the app’s code base, which introduces imprecision when
leaking information through SDK methods, where a taint-set
at the caller side (developer code) but not the taint-get at
the callee side (SDK) can be inlined. In particular, and in
contrast to object types, storing primitives or strings in col-
lections or sharing them across threads are corner cases where
the taints will not be propagated appropriately. This short-
coming can be solved by using pre-computed control-flow
models for framework methods [11] to generate corresponding
taint-set and taint-get pairs that model the transition of data
through the framework. A preferable technical solution in
the future, which removes the potential over-approximations
of SDK internal states in control-flow models [11] and which
could be of interest beyond taint tracking, is the instrumen-
tation of the core image. The core image is a pre-compiled
oat file of the framework classes that is pre-loaded into every
application process via Zygote. Since the core image is cre-
ated with dex2oat during the device startup once after each
system update, it can be instrumented using a sec-compiler
as in ARTist. However, in either case and as in the original
work [17], data that already left the phone (e.g., through a
network socket) cannot be tracked.
Inter-application communication. Our prototype is cur-
rently limited to intra-application tracking and lacks support
for inter-application tracking, for instance, through the file
system or Binder IPC. This opens the possibility of confused
deputy [18, 14] or collusion attacks [30, 10] to exfiltrate
data. Assuming that all installed apps are instrumented,
a fix to this problem would be the instrumentation of the
I/O method calls in order to write out taints together with
the data (e.g., into a file or Binder Parcel) and restore the
taints at receiver side. When abandoning the requirement
for a pure application-layer solution, our system could also
be complemented with the original TaintDroid file system
and IPC infrastructure, which is unaffected by the loss of
DVM, in order to track taints across applications.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented ARTist, a dex2oat compiler-
based instrumentation solution for Android applications that
operates at application-layer only. In order to be able to
design and implement ARTist, we first and foremost had
to thoroughly study the yet uncharted internals of the new
compiler suite and in particular of its Optimizing backend.
A deeper understanding of this compiler suite and the new
ART runtime is insofar of interest for the security commu-
nity, since ART and dex2oat replaced the interpreter-based
runtime (DVM) of Android versions prior to Lollipop (i.e.,
version 5) and hence also voided applicability of any security
solution that relies on interpreter instrumentation (e.g., Taint-
Droid [17] and its derivatives [22, 2]). We study feasibility of
our approach through implementing two distinct use cases.
Furthermore our case study highlights the capability of a
compiler-based instrumentation framework to re-instantiate
basic taint tracking for Android apps on the application layer.
In general, our results provide compelling arguments, such
as higher robustness and better integration, for preferring
compiler-based instrumentation over alternative bytecode or
binary rewriting approaches.
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